In the latest incident, Patrick Webster of OSI Security, is under threat of legal action. This threat comes after he disclosed a vulnerability to First State Superannuation . The vulnerability was a case of direct Object Reference. By manipulating a GET parameter , Webster was able to access the statements of other customers. The legal threat is based around the idea that Webster violated Australian computer crime laws, and bypassed a security measure. Direct Object reference is not bypassing an access control. It is, by its very nature, the lack of an access control. Webster did not go public with this information, but rather went directly to the company to notify them of the flaw. On one hand, the company thanked him for his help. On the other hand they sicked the police after him and are trying to hold him responsible for the cost of fixing the flaw. Customers of First State Superannuation should be outraged at this. The company, which is responsible for protecting their customers' information has failed to do so. When one of these customers showed this failing, they held him responsible for it. The fact is, FSS has been negligent in providing proper security for their customers. They should be held accountable for this failing. Let's make a hypothetical analogy:
A customer walks into his bank, and asks to access his safety deposit box. They ask him his box number, and he tells them the wrong box number by accident. They bring him another person's box without verifying his identity. When he explains the mistake to them, they call the police and have him arrested.
If you read about this scenario in the newspaper you would be outraged. Why should it be any different in this case?
What is even more deeply disturbing, is the fact that this is far from an isolated incident. In the past year, there have been at least 2 other cases just like this. Earlier this year, a security researched by the handle of Acidgen disclosed a buffer overflow vulnerability to German Software company Magix. Acidgen contacted the company with the information, and had supposedly amiable communication with them. During the course of his conversation, he supplied them with a Proof of Concept that opened up calculator when run. He asked the company to let him know when it would be patched so he could release the details after it had been fixed. This is when Magix began threatening legal action against Acidgen. Among their claims, are the claims that sending the PoC to them constituted distribution of 'hacking tools'. They also claim his intent to release the details after a patch constitutes extortion.
Another example is the PlentyofFish.com dating site hack. Security researchers discovered a vulnerability in the site that allowed access to customers' private data. The researchers claim that they simply informed the operators of the site of the vulnerability. In a bizarre twist, the owner of the site posted a bizarre rambling blog post where he claimed that the researchers attempted to extort him. His story was bizarre in the extreme indicating Russian Mob involvement, extortion, and even originally implicated journalist Brian Krebs in this scheme.
What I see here is a very alarming trend. Companies are trying to redirect all blame for their own failings to the very people who are trying to help make them more secure. If this trend continues, researchers will simply stop practicing responsible disclosure to most of these companies. In some cases the disclosure will go back to Full Disclosure practices. Otherwise, some researchers will just keep silent.
So what would First State Superannuation say if Webster had kept silent. Then a month later someone far less scrupulous exploited this vulnerability to attempt to make a profit. FSS should be thanking Webster for saving them all the embarrassment and possible repercussions of their irresponsible 'security' practices. These companies need to wake up and work with the community to help protect themselves, or things are only going to get worse.